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Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are used for securing elec-
tronic designs across the implementation spectrum ranging from
lightweight FPGA to server-class ASIC designs. However, current
PUF implementations are vulnerable to model-building attacks;
they often incur significant design overheads and are challenging
to configure based on application-specific requirements. These fac-
tors limit their application, primarily in the case of the system on
chip (SoC) designs used in diverse applications. In this work, we
propose MeL-PUF – Memory-in-Logic PUF, a low-overhead, dis-
tributed, and synthesizable PUF that takes advantage of existing
logic gates in a design and transforms them to create cross-coupled
inverters (i.e. memory cells) controlled by a PUF control signal. The
power-up states of these memory cells are used as the source of en-
tropy in the proposed PUF architecture. These on-demand memory
cells can be distributed across the combinational logic of various
intellectual property (IP) blocks in a system on chip (SoC) design.
They can also be synthesized with a standard logic synthesis tool
to meet the area/power/performance constraints of a design. By
aggregating the power-up states from multiple such memory cells,
we can create a PUF signature or digital fingerprint of varying size.
We evaluate the MeL-PUF signature quality with both circuit-level
simulations as well as with measurements in FPGA devices. We
show that MeL-PUF provides high-quality signatures in terms of
uniqueness, randomness, and robustness, without incurring large
overheads. We also suggest additional optimizations that can be
leveraged to improve the performance of MeL-PUF .
1 INTRODUCTION AND RELATEDWORK
Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have emerged as a popular
mechanism for authentication. PUFs have been used as random
number generators for crypto applications [15], as a countermea-
sure to defend against IP piracy [21], and to perform chip authenti-
cation [10].
The different PUF structures, proposed over the years, can be
broadly classified into two classes based on the sources of random-
ness i) Delay PUFs and ii) Memory PUFs. Delay PUFs [4], exploit
the variation in delay between two identical paths of a given design.
Examples of delay PUFs include Ring Oscillator PUFs(ROPUF) [20],
and Arbiter PUFs [11]. Memory PUFs on the other hand exploit the
randomness introduced by the SRAM cells when powered on [12].
The PUF structures can also be classified into Strong vs Weak PUFs
based on their ability to handle large input challenges [18]. PUFs
will take a sequence of bits as input which controls the generation of
a response. This combination is referred to as a challenge-response
pair (CRP). Generally, strong PUFs refer to a PUF with multiple
CRPs, meaning the number of CRPs increases exponentially as PUF
size increase [5]. Therefore they can provide a larger range of re-
sponses with minimal overhead. A weak PUF will only output one
response, meaning PUF size correlates to response size linearly [5].
Table 1: Table listing the properties of various PUFs
[9] [13] [8] [7] [22] [3] MeL-PUF
Uniqueness ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Randomness ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓
Unclonability ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Reliability ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Robustness ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓




✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
Fully digital ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
While strong PUF may appear to be the more suitable candidate
the ability to input challenges and readout responses makes them
vulnerable to model-building attacks [6]. Weak PUFs have shown
resistance to model-building attacks making them more desirable
for commercial applications [19]. Delay PUFs like Arbiter PUFs,
and ROPUFs are examples of Strong PUFs, while Memory PUFs are
examples of Weak PUFs.
An interesting observation here is that a majority of the PUF struc-
tures require dedicated structures leading to increased area and
performance overheads. This makes them especially unsuitable for
resource-constrained environments such as the Internet of Things
applications. Strong PUFs are vulnerable towards model-building
attacks while weak PUFs require specialized structures for imple-
mentation. Additionally, these structures are vulnerable to tamper-
ing attacks where the attacker could remove the PUF structure and
thus bypass the authentication mechanism. Table 1 summarizes the
capabilities of the existing PUFs reported in the literature.
In this paper, we present MeL-PUF , a novel fully synthesizable
PUF structure obtained by integrating memory elements into the
digital logic of a combinational circuit. Figure 1(a) illustrates the
MeL-PUF structure. MeL-PUF consists of two cross-coupled invert-
ers connected to form a bistable memory cell. Upon powering on,
the values at the two inverter inputs are randomly initialized due
entering a meta-stable state. The value at the output stabilizes to
either a 1 or a 0 at random. MeL-PUF consists of a control logic
comprising of a multiplexer and control signal. The control signal
can be used to read the value of the bi-stable element. Figure 1(b)
shows the proposed MeL-PUF structure integrated into a digital
design. To the best of our knowledge MeL-PUF is the first fully
synthesizable PUF structure. We show that our proposed MeL-PUF
structure incurs low overhead, and can be incorporated into a wide
variety of designs. We demonstrate the utility of MeL-PUF using
both simulation and hardware implementation.
The paper is organized as follows: we describe the MeL-PUF struc-
ture in section 2. We discuss the evaluation of our proposed PUF
structure along with its overheads in section 3. We highlight the
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(a) MeL-PUF Structure (b) MeL-PUF , highlighted in red, embedded in a combinational
circuit.
(c) MeL-PUF signature generation process
Figure 1: The logical structure, implementation, and working principle of MeL-PUF . Each element of MeL-PUF can be con-
figured into a memory cell (cross-coupled inverter) using a control signal. The power-up states of the memory cells act as the
entropy source for the PUF.
2 MEL-PUF : MEMORY IN LOGIC PUF
2.1 MeL-PUF Structure
Figure 1(a) illustrates the proposed MeL-PUF structure. MeL-PUF
consists of two cross-coupled inverter structures and a control
element, thus constituting the structure of a memory element, such
as an SRAM cell. Upon startup, the output of the bistable element is
unknown and is random, which is then used as our PUF response.
The structure of the PUF allows us to distribute and place the PUF
in the data-path of a combinational circuit as shown in Figure 1(b).
This is accomplished through the control MUX. A two-input MUX
allows us to switch between the PUF response and logic data.
Figure 1(b) depicts MeL-PUF implementation where we incor-
porate bi-stable memory element in a circuit to create a PUF. The
additional MeL-PUF circuitry is highlighted in red, with original
paths in black. During power-up, the output of the memory cell
results in an unknown state, which we use as our source of entropy.
The output of one inverter is connected to a MUX which acts as the
control element. When the control signal is low, the MUX allows
the PUF signature to be captured at startup.When the control signal
is high, then the circuit functions normally.
2.2 MeL-PUF Signature Generation
The data-paths for generating a response from the PUF are outlined
in figure 1(c). The PUF structure can be inserted and distributed
throughout a circuit as shown in figure 1(b). On startup, the bistable
element enters a metastable state, similar to an SRAM cell. As such
the state in which the bistable element stabilizes is unknown and
random. In the example shown in figure 1(c), the value of inverter 1
stabilizes to 1 and is sampled by the control element. This is shown
as the blue data-path. When the control signal, highlighted in red, is
low the output of inverter 1 is sampled as the PUF output. Sampling
multiple PUF elements and combining their response allows you to
create a signature unique to the device or chip.
2.3 MeL-PUF Integration
In our proposed approach, we incorporate the PUF elements into the
datapath or control logic of a combinational design. We accomplish
this as described in the following steps:
(1) Judiciously selecting the gates where the feedback loop can
be created and adding the feedback loop there such that we
create a cross-coupled inverter with special emphasis on
making it symmetric.
(2) Controlling the feedback loop by incorporating MUXes or
other control logic in the feedback path and control signals.
(3) By connecting the output of the cross-coupled inverter to
the scan chain (or to primary outputs using muxes).
3 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
PUFs demonstrate the following four properties [14]: uniqueness,
reliability, unclonability, and randomness. Uniqueness is the ability
of the PUF to produce distinct signatures for different challenges.
Reliability is defined as the ability to produce the same response for
the same input challenge every time. Unclonability is the property
of a PUF that withstands against any replication, and randomness
means that the corresponding PUF can generate random signatures
for a wide variety of input challenges. We evaluate our proposed
PUF structure based on these metrics using both transistor-level
simulations and implementation on an FPGA.
3.1 MeL-PUF Simulation and Analysis
We create a transistor-level model of theMeL-PUF circuit in HSPICE
using the 45 nmhigh-performance CMOS process node from Predic-
tive Technology Model (PTM) [1]. We use an input clock frequency
of 100 MHz signal to this circuit along with the nominal supply
voltage, 𝑉𝐷𝐷 = 1.0 V. We initialize all the circuit nodes as ’0’ at
the beginning of the simulation. We consider the manufacturing
process variations by combining the effects of physical specifica-
tions such as 𝑡𝑜𝑥 ,𝑊 , 𝐿, etc. into a single parameter- the threshold
voltage, 𝑉𝑡ℎ [16]. We model these process variations as variations
of 𝑉𝑡ℎ by using a Gaussian distribution for 10000 MeL-PUF circuit
models/instances with 𝜎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟−𝑑𝑖𝑒 = 25%. We apply the in-built pa-
rameter distribution function of HSPICE,AGAUSS, to shift/skew the
transistor threshold values to generate this distribution as depicted
in Fig. 2(a). To characterize the effect of manufacturing process vari-
ations, we perform Monte-Carlo simulation on power-up values
at nominal temperature, 𝑇𝑁𝑂𝑀 = 25 ◦C on the generated model.
Each Monte-Carlo simulation run results in a 1-bit power-up value
for that specific MeL-PUF circuit instance, and we use that as a
corresponding binary signature. Fig. 2(b) illustrates the gray col-
ormap of collected power-up values for 10000 MeL-PUF instances,
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(a) Distribution of transistor𝑉𝑡ℎ variations for
HSPICE Monte-Carlo simulation.
(b) Gray colormap of simulated MeL-
PUF power-up values.
(c) Inter-HD results for simulated MeL-PUF . (d) Comparison of MeL-PUF robustness
at different temperature levels.
Figure 2: MeL-PUF evaluation using HSPICE simulation results over collected 64000 CRPs.
Figure 3: (a) Board used for PUF implementation. (b) image
of Quartus Chip planner for the implemented circuit.
where the dark dots indicate power-up states of ‘1‘ and white dots
represent the ‘0’s. In our experiment, we discover that 5033 out of
the total 10000 simulated circuit instances startup with ‘1’ and the
rest appear to have a bias towards ‘0’ as their power-up values. To
investigate the performance as a PUF, we build a circuit model with
64 instances of MeL-PUF for each Monte-Carlo simulation to collect
64-bit PUF responses from each run; thus, we collect 640000 power-
up values/signatures from all 10000 runs. We evaluate the security
performance of the simulated MeL-PUF in terms of uniqueness,
robustness, and randomness.
3.1.1 Uniqueness Analysis. We assess the uniqueness of MeL-PUF
by calculating the inter-chip Hamming distance (inter-HD). Inter-
HD is the difference in number of bits obtained by applying the
same signature to two different boards. Inter-HD is calculated using







𝐻𝐷 (𝑆𝑢 , 𝑆𝑣)
𝑛
× 100 (1)
Fig. 2(c) illustrates the uniqueness results of the collected signatures
(at 𝑇𝑁𝑂𝑀 = 25 ◦C) in terms of inter-HD. Here, the X-axis shows
the percentage of difference of bits between the responses, and
the Y-axis shows the number of times the bit difference occurs.
We observe that the simulation design of MeL-PUF demonstrates
49.82% inter-HD, which is very close to an ideal case.
3.1.2 Robustness Analysis. We use the intra-Hamming distance
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× 100 (2)
intra-HD is the difference in response offered when two different
challenges are applied to the same PUF implementation. intra-HD
is estimated using equation 2. We assess the intra-HD by simulating
the operation of MeL-PUF over five different temperature levels:
0, 20, 45, 65, and 85 ◦C (at nominal 𝑉𝐷𝐷 = 1.0 V). Fig. 2(d) shows
the percentage bit-errors in terms of average intra-HD at differ-
ent temperature levels. We observed that the PUF exhibits 8.37%,
1.23%, 6.03%, 11.49%, and 15.89% bit-errors 0, 20, 45, 65, and 85
◦C respectively.
3.1.3 Randomness Analysis. To evaluate the randomness, we per-
form simulation on our MeL-PUF model and collect one million re-
sponse bits to facilitate in assessing some tests in the NIST (National
Institute of Standards and Technology) randomness test suite [2].
We observed that generated sequences successfully pass all of the
performed tests at a 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 higher than 0.001. Thus we con-
clude that the simulated MeL-PUF responses are random with a
confidence level of 99.9%.
3.2 Hardware-level Evaluation of MeL-PUF
We also validate our MeL-PUF structure by implementing it on
an FPGA platform. We used a Max 10 FPGA (10M50SAE144C8G)
based platform [17]. Figure 3(a) presents the layout of the FPGA
board. We used ISCAS85 benchmark circuits to insert the MeL-PUF
structure. To ensure that the LUTs were not simplified or combined
with any other logic a keep attribute was used in VHDL. Internal
observation points are also added to the circuit observing the output
of the control MUXes. These points are routed to RAM (Random
Access Memory) and used to extract the signature through the in-
systemmemory content editor of Quartus software. To test different
regions of the board, LUT placements for the PUF are set using the
assignment editor.
To evaluate the signatures generated by our design, we insert a set of
PUFs into an ISCAS85 benchmark circuit for signature generation.
This design is programmed to a Max 10 FPGA and we sample
1024-bit signatures from the circuit for ten boards. For each board,
we sample five different LUT regions and collect four signatures
per-region. These regions were used to calculate the uniqueness,
reliability, and randomness of our PUF. Signatures are collected
under nominal conditions (3.3 V at 25 °C). Additionally, we also
sampled the signatures under a range of voltages between 3 V -
1.97 V to quantify the robustness of our designed PUF.
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(a) Histogram depicting the measurement
of inter-HD for the experimental measure-
ments, indicating uniqueness.
(b) Histogram depicting the measurement
of intra-HD for the experimental measure-
ments, indicating reliability.
(c) Uniqueness measurements for improved
PUF responses.
(d) Reliability measurements for improved
PUF responses.
Figure 4: Figure showing the evaluation of MeL-PUF on FPGA. (a) represents the uniqueness, (b) shows the reliability results,
(c) and (d) show the improvement in uniqueness and reliability using the optimizations described in section 4
3.2.1 Uniqueness. Figure 4(a) shows the histogram plotting the
uniqueness between all boards. The X-axis shows the percentage of
different bits between signatures. The y-axis shows the frequency
at which these differences occurred. The average inter-hamming
distance is recorded for our results is 46.40%, giving us close to the
ideal result of 50%.
3.2.2 Reliability. The reliability of MeL-PUF is calculated by com-
paring signatures from the same LUT region over multiple mea-
surements. Certain LUTs may exhibit different levels of stability
due to manufacturing variations. Figure 4(b) shows a histogram of
reliability, giving our solution an average inter hamming distance
is 3.07%.
3.2.3 Randomness. The Randomness evaluation of the experimen-
tal results is shown in Table 2. We obtained the signatures from
ten different boards and used these signatures for evaluating the
randomness of MeL-PUF . We used the NIST Test Suite for our eval-
uation and performed the tests shown in Table 2 on each signature
sequence.
3.2.4 Robustness. As a measure of PUF robustness, voltage varia-
tions are also taken into account. In this case, the typical voltage
supplied to the board is 3.3 V. We collect data for voltages between 3
V - 1.97 V and compare the signature to those of 3.3 V. The average
Hamming distances are shown in the table 3. The average inter-HD
between voltages is recorded as 7% and the intra-HD as 2%. Signifi-
cant changes only begin occurring at 2.2 V when the inter-HD rose
to 4%, with the highest being 13% at 1.97 V, the lowest the board
could function. Above 2.2V, the variations were around 2.5% which
is a reasonable variation. We observe that the reliability of the PUF
is not significantly affected at different voltages.
4 ANALYSIS
4.0.1 Improvements to Uniqueness and Reliability. Since the rout-
ing of the LUTs is not perfect, there exists an asymmetry among the
paths between the two LUTs. This results in a bias in the generated
signatures. We observed that LUT towards the bottom of a LAB
tended to have a higher delay. We leverage this to improve the
uniqueness and reliability of the PUF signature. We chose 4 differ-
ent PUF configurations D1-D4, as shown in Figure 5. We sample the
signatures obtained from multiple regions of the board and elimi-
nate the LUTs exhibiting bias. Figure 4(c) and Figure 4(d) show the
improvement in inter-HD and intra-HD.We observed that inter-HD
rose to 47.30% while intra-HD reduced to 1.75% for configuration
D4 shown in Figure 5(d).
4.0.2 PUF Distribution and Randomness. We also considered the
effect of the adjacent LABs on the randomness of the PUF responses.
We evaluated this by varying the PUF configuration as shown
in Figure 5. We observed that the distribution that had the least
number of overlaps resulted in the highest randomness values. We
evaluated the four PUF configurations using the NIST test suite and
present the results in Table 2. Configuration D4 shown in Figure 5(d)
resulted in the highest randomness values.
5 CONCLUSION
The emergence of the internet of things (IoT) era has necessitated
low-cost, low-resource, robust, and highly secure hardware-based
authentication primitives. We have presented a novel PUF imple-
mentation paradigm that can be integrated into combinational logic
and is distributed, synthesizable, easily configurable, and light-
weight (in terms of area, power, performance overhead). Such a
PUF implementation can serve as an attractive authentication prim-
itive in diverse applications, including IoT. While the proposed
PUF is a weak PUF and provides one-bit entropy per cell, it is
capable of generating a high-quality signature in terms of unique-
ness, randomness, and robustness. We have evaluated MeL-PUF
implementations using simulation and FPGA platform with promis-
ing results. Our future work will include further optimization of
the PUF design, analysis of the effectiveness of MeL-PUF further
through measurements, and evaluation on large scale designs.
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